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decode them? How does one come to understand both the need for and the meaning ofnew legislation, particularly ifthe surface meanings seem to mask deeper political, social or cultural influences and beliefs? Even when we can fully and accurately identify the proffered messages, is newly created legislation always the best response to the events that precipitated the change?
These questions dovetail the long-standing jurisprudential debate concerning the meaning of legislative pronouncements. Out of this debate, two dominant conceptions ofthe meaning oflegislation emerge. One school of thought views the process ofcreating legislation as a true communicative enterprise. 10 As such, legislation performs a signaling function, and the emitted signal is to be read in accordance with the "accepted standards of communication in effect in the given environment."'' This perspective suggests that the meaning ofthe legislation is reflected within the legislation itself-as a stand-in for the legislature's intentions and the direct means by which those intentions are manifested. Stated most simply, understanding legislation's signals has wide-ranging implications for how one interprets the meaning ofstatutes. How one divines those intentions, whether the intentions are overt or not, and whose actual intentions are implicated are complexities raised by this approach.
A contrasting view rejects the idea that legislation comes about as a result ofan intentional communicative process. 12 Adherents to this position believe that statutes fail to meet the requirements for communicative signaling because in order to fmd communication, the communicator must actually "intend" the communication, and the audience must be receptive to the intended message." Proponents of this approach note that gleaning the "intent" ofa legislative body is an implausible exercise because a legislature is comprised ofa disparate group ofindividuals, likely holding both majority and minority ideas.•• Thus, identification of the "intent" behind a compromised pronouncement is folly." Accordingly, statutes are not "authoritative communications" of the legislatw"e, 16 but rather "empirical descriptions of optimal legal arrangements."" This approach advocates that legislation does not function as a signal of the legislatw"e's intention, but rather as a sign possessing natural, self-contained meaning.'" A sign is a symptom ofa condition to which it has a causal relationship.•• The goal is to identify and understand the condition and thus discern the meaning of that sign.>• Each ofthese perspectives has merit and adds much to the thinking about new legislation and its meaning. Looking for interpretive guidance may tum on the persuasive impact ofeach respective argument. The contribution this debate makes to resolving the issues addressed in this Essay is the shared recognition that both communicative and descriptive expressions in legislation convey messages. It is the identification and unpacking of the meaning of these messages that interests us. Whether the messages are communicative or descriptive, they speak volumes about the climate in which legislation is enacted and how it will be implemented. For those concerned with the transparency and functionality of legal regimes, the central and important question is what messages legislative enactments convey.
Given that legal, social, cultural and economic landscapes are dynamic and ever-changing, it is only natural to ask whether the messages sent by the legislative pronouncement are an accurate reflection of and response to current environmental circumstances.
Certainly in the bankruptcy context-where first we were lauding and then, within months, dramatically changing the same law-profound and compelling questions have surfaced concerning the messages conveyed by BAPCP A. These messages can best be understood in the context of the political process, the dominant cultural and social norms, and the economics of the marketplace. In recent years, this context has included major galvanizing events-environmental disasters, occurrences ofterrorism, and the Enron and WorldCom debacles to name but a few. Such events generated not only media attraction, but also legislative responses. Moreover, the messages can only be fully understood and appreciated in the context of how the system was perceived to be and how it was actually operating before the amendments-as well as in the context of how the system, post-amendment, will work when it is operationalized. Once the law begins to operate, the real and practical impact of the 2005 Amendments on the bankruptcy system and its participants will be evident. We see messaging as a phenomenon that can only be untangled by a complex and deliberate contextualizing of the 2005 Amendments.
Related to the question of what messages are conveyed by legislative enactments is the matter of the nature of the enacted legislation itself. If legislation is warranted, how should that legislation be crafted? Should it be targeted to a particular problem or issue or should it be broader in its orientation? The issue is when and what type of legislation (or legislative amendment), ifany, is needed to respond to changed and changing conditions. Consideration must also be given to whether pausing and permitting more gradual but perceptible market responses or judicial decisions (or some combination of the two) are better ways to address the actual and perceived problems. In other words, legislating-whatever its message-may not always be the best solution, despite our predisposition to its employment. This very tendency to legislate too freely has led to a condition known as hyperlexis.2 2 To be sure, none of these are simple questions and there are no easy answeB-in bankruptcy or any other substantive field of law. The newly enacted amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, however, offer a prime illustration ofembedded legislative messaging. In this Essay, we explore the meaning of at least one ofthe major messages we believe is conveyed by the bankruptcy legislation. In so doing, we address the factors that assist us in divining this message, and we also address the larger issue ofhow embedded messages manifest themselves. We further consider a related interesting question which has surfitced in the bankruptcy context, namely the failure to legislate. We ask specifically whether failing to legislate is also a message, and, if so, what that message of silence means-at least in the bankruptcy term "h)l>OI'lexis"to describe "American 'snationaldisease-tbepatbologicalconditioo caused byao overactive law-making gland. Measured by aoy aod every index, our law is exploding. New statutes, regulations, and ordinances are increasing at geometric rates at all levels ofgovenunent The same is true ofreported decisions by couns aod administrative agencies."). We do not mimic Manning's broad use of . the term aod. thus, we are taking liberties in applying it in a ruurower c~text.
arena. Hopefully, some of the insights with respect to bankruptcy law-both with respect to what was and was not chaiige~are transportable as others contemplate the messages inherent in new legislation in other substantive fields.
To this end, this Essay begins with a discussion of messaging in bankruptcy and then turns to examine examples drawn from the Bankruptcy Code in terms of instances in which changes were made and other instances in which amendments were not enacted. We focus our attention on four emblematic issues-two involving changes made to the Bankruptcy Code (namely, the addition of requirements for approving key employee retention plans (known as KERPS) and the pre-bankruptcy consumer credit counseling mandate)' 3 and two involving instances where amendments could have been, but were not, made (the definition of future claims and the Code's treatment of limited liability companies (LLCs)).
ll. MESSAGES SENT
Ifone looks holistically at the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, a common thread runs through many ofthe amended provisions: a movement away from flexible guidelines or standards that are malleable enough to respond to a variety ofsituations--one ofthe hallmarks ofthe pre-amendment Bankruptcy Code. These standards have largely been replaced by rigidly constructed rules with detailed timetables, procedures and requirements. The move from a standards-based to a rule-based approach is achieved through what we refer to as "particularization. " 25 Most fundamentally, a particularized statute is designed to address a myriad of specific circumstances, instance by instance. It has the capacity to target either selected players in the bankruptcy process or specific actions or circumstances. Ifsomeone or something is so targeted, a particularized Code dictates results or at least mandates choices. Such detailed targeting must anticipate a plethora of contexts and, not smprisingly, often results in the dramatic expansion of the literal length of the Code. Thus, a statute that has been particularized is transformed from a set of standards that apply to all parties impacted or affected by the law to a detailed-often exquisitely--set 25. See Manning, supra note 22, at 767.
ofspecific, targeted dictates. In eliminating or substantially curtailingjudicial discretion, the particularized rules, rather than case law, become authoritative. To understand fully the move toward particularization in the context of bankruptcy law, one needs to step back and broadly reflect upon the changes made to the Code and the rhetoric that accompanied their enactment. Many proponents of the 2005 Amendments-Republicans and Democrats alike-articulated that the changes were an effort to curb abuses and to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of the bankruptcy system's benefits.>• According to the bill's "history," the 2005 Amendments were an attempt to "improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair to both debtors and creditors.'m Among the provisions that evidence this objective is the amended Section 707(b). 28 This section, relating to the dismissal of cases, now contains the widely and popularly discussed "means test."
29 As a general matter, it is hard to argue against legislation that attempts to derail abusers and eliminate cheating. Few would take issue with the idea that people who can readily pay all oftheir legitimate debts in full should do so. And even for those ofus who believe that former Section 707 addressed that very issue fairly and effectively, legislation designed to achieve integrity and fairness is, at the meta level, a positive development. So, if there is a direct correspondence between the harm the legislation is designed to address and the fix, then it would seem-at least at first blush-that such a particularized provision is a warranted and appropriate response. Section 707(b) now includes a myriad of detailed requirements identifying which individual debtors will be permitted to remain in the Code's liquidation chapter (Chapter 7) and which debtors will have their cases dismissed. 30 The application of the means test requires a host of new forms, rules and cross referencing to non-bankruptcy databases for information to determine whether specified thresholds are met (for example, the median family income in the debtor's state for a family ofsimilar size). 31 It requires debtors, who are often at a crisis point, to present detailed documentation of their fmancial circumstances.
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Once this cumbersome and procedurally burdensome provision is operationalized, it will not improve bankruptcy law and practice, but have the effect, we suspect, of shutting many ''honest but unfortunate debtors" 33 out of the bankruptcy system. Consider, for example, the impact of the new legislation on the victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
The political, social and economic climate in which these amendments were adopted is instructive in our quest to divine their embedded messages. We are living in a time of weakening social safety nets. Individuals are increasingly being asked to look inward or to the private sector for the most basic level ofsubsistence. Our ownership society, despite its surface appeal, has had trouble reaching those who live in our poorest neighborhoods and in our lowest income quartiles. 34 These are observations offact-<lbservations about the demographic context within which the Code was amended. Regardless ofone's political proclivities, the demographics are hard to deny.
In looking at the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in the context in which they were enacted and in thinking specifically about how the bankruptcy system works in practice, we see something other than the just identified surface purposes emerging. A different and ultimately more troubling message about the bankruptcy system and its players is being advanced: distrust. The theme ofdistrust does not appear in the words ofthe Code; nor does it appear as a clear or articulated theme in the legislative history. But it is, we think, one of the central messages radiating from the 2005 bankruptcy amendments. The particularized amendments, when assessed in light ofboth their effects in practice, as well as the social, political and economic context in which they were enacted, reveal a distrust of many central participants in the bankruptcy process. Included among the distrusted groups are debtors (most particularly consumer debtors, former officers ofcompanies that have failed due to fraud or other wrongdoing, and those in management of mega Chapter II cases), debtors' lawyers (specifically those representing consumers}, and the judiciary (most particularly the bankruptcy bench). In essence, it is the distrust ofthese central participants that has led to legislation that strips these very participants of flexibility. The new particularized rules attempt to circumscribe the central participants' conduct within the bankruptcy system. Stated differently, particularized legislation is the vehicle for communicating distrust What is pernicious is that the message of distrust has not been raised or openly debated. As such, this means that the process of crafting the legislation did not delve into whether the distrust is or is not warranted. Instead, we have assumed its accuracy and legislated away discretion and disabled these "untrustworthy actors" from fully participating in the system. What we have now is evidence of the distrust; what we are missing is the empirical support for it. As we operationalize the new Code, we will regularly confront the evidence of distrust. How we handle that evidence affects how the Code will operate in practice-a topic we address later.
ill. AMENDED SECTION 503: KEY EMPLOYEE RETENTION PAYMENTS
A prime example ofa particularized amendment whose message can only be understood in light of the context in which it was enacted is found in Section 503(cV' Entitled "Allowance ofAdministrative Expenses," Section 503 has been amended to outline the terms of when and to what extent payments may be made to retain key employees ofa reorganizing debtor firm (commonly known as "KERP" payments or plans). 36 To be sure, KERP (2004); see also Borrus, supra note 21, at 82 ("Since the 1990s, so-called key employee retention pi1111&-0ffcring "pay to stay" bonuses to manageB--bave become a staple ofbusin<&s bankruptcies. Critics harp that the practice is misguided, rewarding the team that sleercd the company into trouble. A 1989 study by Harvard Business School professor Stuart C. Gilson sbowingtbatcbiefexecutives who depart big bankrupt companies rarely land top jobs elsewbere supports the view that such managers don't deserverewards."); Len Boselovic, Seeing Green in the Red; KeyEmployees PaidBonusa to Remain During Banlrruptcies, PrrTsauRGH PoST-GAZETTE, Oct. 9, 2001, at El ("Cash-strapped Pacific Gas & Electric was baokrupted by its inability to recover billiCIIS ofdollars in fuel charges fiom its customers. Yet somehow, Califania's largest investor-owned utility could afli>rd paying an C<tra $17.4 million to more than 200 of its key managers. example, the retention bonuses paid to executive vice presidents ofAdelphia were up to 200% of their base salaries, provided certain performance goals were met." In the Jacobson's bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved bonuses of $5.3 million to be paid to 190 of its top employees. 39 Such payments, made from a finite pool of resources, exemplify a tension familiar in Chapter 11 cases: balancing the interests ofworkers and other creditors in getting paid with the debtor's interest in a successful reorganization. These payments did not happen, however, outside the purview ofthe courts: courts regularly are presented with applications for employee retention. 40 The courts § S03(c) requirements, bankiUptcy courts relied on a more relaxed business judgment test: "Retentioo plans will be approved wbere (i) !bedebtorbas fonnulated a plan after using proper business judgment and (ii) the court fmds the retention plan to be 'fair and reasonable."'); Talaski,supra note 39;seealsoln re MontganeryWanl HoldingCorp.,242B.R. 147,15 I, ISS (D. Del. 1999) (affirming a 3-part employee incentive plan few over $70 million; the retention incentive ponion of the plan provided li>r 10% of !be debtors' key.management employees, i.e., SOO managers UNIVERSI1Y OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:497 listen to testimony advocating the positions ofvarious parties (including the committee and the United States Trustee), and each application is granted the opportunity for careful scrutiny.
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Amended Section 503 addressing KERP payments includes far more specific rules and particularized limitations on the circumstances under which a reorganizing debtor may pay retention bonuses to key employees. 42 Under the amended provisions, a payment cannot be made absent a fmding by the court that the payment was needed to retain the individual in question based on a showing that the person had a bona fide job offer from another entity at the same or greater pay, that the person's services are essential to the survival of the business, and either the payment was not greater than ten times the payments to non-management personnel during the same calendar year or, if no such payments were made, no more than 25 percent ofthe amount paid to that person in the previous year. 1990) (approving a notention BJ!R'cment IIDd seversnce pay plan for the company's ChiefFinancial Officer, finding it to be a necessary inccnti~ to his continued employment during the Chapter II recqani2ation, but denying !be debtor company's request for a retention plan for other gcncraJIIDd key employees).
41. It is widely understood that this provision emerged as a reaction to the outsized and highly publicized bankruptcies of Enron,' 48 is a notable example. What also grew out of the impulse to "do something" with respect to corporate management overreaching was amended Section 503.
The sizeable payments Enron made to certain key employees following · its bankruptcy filing captured the public's attention and imagination. For example, the bankruptcyjudge approved$140 million in retention bonuses for key managers.
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In contrast, Enron's rank and file employees suffered substantial losses. 5° The public's outrage in response to these large retention payments was aggravated by the circumstances surrounding Enron 's demise: it is alleged that massive fraud was perpetuated by Emon's management.5 1 It seems clear that this legislative amendment to Section 503 was a reaction to a specific, well-publicized problem. But was a legislative response the right one? Was there an alternative way of addressing the underlying issue? In the absence ofthis "legislative fix," the bankruptcy court could have approved or disapproved the terms of Enron's proposed "KERP" program based upon the common law necessity doctrine and/or Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
S.C. § I OS(a) (2000)
. Under Code § lOS(a), the "cwrt may issue any order, process, or judsment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions oftbis title." The outer limits oftbis broadly stated principle are tested by tbc "Necessity of Payment Rule," also known as tbc "Doctrine ofNecessity." It is unclear wbetber tbe rule remains valid under the Code. In reuganizltion cases affected with the public interest, tbe Necessity ofPsyrncnt Rule may pennit the early paymentofprcpctitioo claims of critical creditors wbo thrcstcn otherwise to witbbold goods or services believed to be css<ntial to tbe continued viability oftbe debtor's business RDd thus to tbc rcoqpmizalion. The doctrine thus does no more tbRD allow a DIP or trustee to succumb to economic sanctions imposed by a creditor holding a monopolistic position. It is not a rule ofpriority but is only recognition ofcompelled payment. Claimants ba"" no rights pwsuRDt to tbe necessity rule, which is not a rule ofequity at all. Indeed, tbe sine qua non of the doctrine is thai tbe claimant is acting in equitably by coercins payroll!I. [T]he new provisions deprive bankruptcy courts oftheir ability to exercise discretion in determining which filctors to consider and the relative weight to be given to the various factors when deciding whether to appmve a retention or severance PrtJBI'8DI· ... [I]f a compaoy planning to file for balllauptcy protection imminently seeks to implement a KERP or similar plan, it seems sdvisable to implement such a plan prior to filing bankruptcy. Doing so may prevent the need to obtain bankruptcy court approval ofsuch a plan under the strict standards imposed by the BAPCPA, and place the bwden mother parties to affumativdy seek to avoid pre-bankruptcy payments made to executives purwant to such a plan. Gary M. Kaplan As Dean Manning aptly observed in critiquing our propensity to legislate, "A significant part ofthe hyperlexis problem arises from the effort to deal with problems with too great particularity. Contrary to surface impression, detailed specificity in a legal provision does not reduce disputes; particularization merely changes the vocabulary of the dispute.'"'" Particularization also limits flexibility. The newrules addressing KERPs may make some sense in the context of the Enron case, but, happily, Enron was an outlier. Furthermore, the changes were not needed had a court simply denied the retention bonuses. The vast majority of business bankruptcies do not involve fraud"" or extreme disparities in compensation between workers and management!' In many cases, retention payments outside the parameters purposes, and may fiuthcr induce them to take a new position (though not one that is necessarily more lucrative) because of the certainty of employment that a new job may provide, versus the uncertainty ofstaying the course in cbapter II. The restrictions on bonuses and severance packages may also dampen the enthusiasm ofkey penonnel for continued employment with the debtor.
CraigE. Reimer &Michael P. Ricbman (May20,200S) ; Skee~supra note 37,81 1475 ("Probibilingpsy-to-stay could pMvent firms from retaining employees they need most In many cases the ~oyees with bonus lsden contracts sre new msnagers wbo were brought in prier to bankruptcy to oyersee the restructuring effon.").
Though arguing for less judicial discretion is now in VOIPIC, and Congress has spent several yesrs attempting to curtail the discmion ofbankruptcyjudges, there simply is no reason to legislatively dictate when bankruptcy courts can approve employee retention cr sevemnce programs. ... If bankruptcy courts had excn:ised their discrelion in a haphazard, unpredictable fashion or had not required debtors to demonstrate that the psymenls provide a valuable benefit to the estate, Congress would be justified in legislatively dictating when such psyments should be allowed. 
57.
But the amendment failed to recognize thai key executi'?"' and managers are often contributing to set forth in the amendment to Section 503 may make sense for a manufacturingcompanywith long-term experienced management. There may be many good reasons--reasons that make business and economic senso--for parties and courts to retain existing management, even at a price. 51 But, because of the hard cases presented by Enron and similar business debtors, and some occasional judicial acquiescence without apparent support, we now have bad law.
IV. NEW SECTION 111: MANDATORY CREDIT COUNSELING FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS
Another equally compelling example ofparticularization can be fo101d in the new mandates with respect to consumer credit counseling. 59 Contained primarily in Sections 1 09(h) and Ill, these were both added as part of the 2005 Amendments. 60 Section 109(h) contains the counseling requirement itself and details certain exceptions.
61 Section Ill sets forth, among other things, the requirements for those seeking to be approved providers of pre bankruptcy budget and credit counseling.
62
The possibility of avoiding bankruptcy reliefthrough credit counseling is not a new idea; indeed, it dates back to the mid-1960s. 63 Until the 2005 Amendments, consumers were not required to obtain counseling as a prerequisite to bankruptcy relief. There was no analog to Section I 09(h) and Section 111 in the former Bankruptcy Code. 64 purposes of this new requirement are that consumers should only make the decision to seek bankruptcy relief after considering other plausible alternatives; it was perceived that many consumers, perhaps on the advice of counsel, were precipitously filing bankruptcies. 65 Moreover, there was a sense that ifmore consumers were channeled into pre-bankruptcy debt management plans, creditors-most especially credit card companies-would receive more money than they would receive ifconsumers sought reliefunder Chapter 7 of the Code where recoveries are limited for debtors with few exempt assets. 66 Many would agree that thoughtful assessment of alternatives to bankruptcy is a wise idea. At the meta level, most people would agree that bankruptcy should not be the choice of first resort when there is financial strain; bankruptcy is a legal step that should not be undertaken lightly. Its consequences-both actual and perceptual-are real.
67
Forgetting for a moment the fact that, oflate, the credit counseling industry has been subjected to considerable criticism for its poor and unscrupulous treatment of individuals in debt, 68 the notion of pre-bankruptcy counseling has appeal. With that said, there are clearly individuals for whom counseling will not be beneficial-either because of the circumstances that led to their indebtedness or the quality of advice they received from their legal team. · Moreover, to the extent counseling is considered as a national mandate for the almost two million individuals who access the system annually, there are some individuals who need bankruptcy relief but who cannot readily obtain the required counseling. So, any thoughtful and workable mandate needs to provide some exceptions built into the system Some of the categories of exceptions are self-evident. If there is no counseling available in a given region, individuals living in those regions should not be denied access to bankruptcy relief. If individuals must file for relief due to exigent circumstances and there is no counseling available on an immediate basis, absence of counseling should not be grounds for denial of access to the bankruptcy process. There are also likely to be categories of individuals for whom obtaining counseling will be difficult, if not impossible. It is this category of individuals that is addressed in new Section 109(h). Section 1 09(h) sets forth in detail those situations in which an exception can be made!" What is striking is the degree of particularization that is provided, as if courts and debtors' lawyers were not capable of singling out those individuals who should obtain a counseling exemption. It is also as if there is an assumption that whole groups of individuals will beat down the doors to fit within the counseling exception. The level ofdistrust is palpable when the details of Section I 09(h) are unpacked.
Section 109(h) provides that consumers who are incapacitated, disabled and on active military duty can be excepted from the counseling mandate.
71
However, the definition ofeach ofthese three categories of"excepted" debtor is very limited. "Incapacity" is defined in Section 109(h)(4) as "impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with respect to his fmancial responsibilities.'m "Disability" is defined in the same subsection as a person "so physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort, to participate in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing [the means by which counseling can be delivered]." 73 The military exception requires that the debtor be on active duty "in a military combat zone."
74 Those seeking to fit within these narrow exceptions need to obtain court approval.
75
Several things are inunediately obvious from the way in which these categories of individuals are defmed. They are so narrowly constructed that almost no one will fit within them. Someone who fits the definition of incapacitated would be someone who likely could not even seek bankruptcy relief without a conservator or guardian authorized to file for the relief on their behalf; this is because few, if any, courts would permit an individual so lacking in rational thought to be a debtor. Consider how disabled a person would need to be in order to be considered unable to obtain some counseling-notjust in person but over the telephone or Internet. Basically, the only person who would fit the criteria would be someone in a coma, on a ventilator, or who was both deaf and blind. Arguably, a quadriplegic would not satisfy the test ifsomeone could hold a phone to the person's ear or place the counseling call on a speaker. The only members of the military who would fit within this exception would seem to be those in Iraq or perhaps 70 Afghanistan, which may be the only locations we consider active military zones. Soldiers on a submarine or on an aircraft carrier would not fit within the exception.
By creating this level ofspecificity, judicial discretion is eliminated as if the judiciary were not capable of determining individuals who were sufficiently incapacitated or disabled to enable an exception to the counseling mandate. Indeed, the message seems to be that many debtors would claim to be incapacitated or disabled to avoid the counseling requirement, with no evidence that this category of individual was desirous of gaming the system. Indeed, one could hypothesize that those with these impairments may be seeking debt relief because their medical and custodial costs are so high and their insurance, if any, so inadequate, that they need financial relief. Indeed, given their situation, relief from fmancial burdens seems to be the least the legal system can provide. While debt among military personnel is a very real problem, 76 it is difficult to justify an exception for those only in a combat zone; debt can and does occur when one is serving abroad in a military but non-combat arena.
77
One can also posit some individuals who should be excepted from counseling who do not fit within the three identified categories. The new legislation prohibits the courts from creating additional exceptions for these prospective debtors. 78 Consider someone who cannot find counseling in their native language. Consider someone with enormous caregiving obligations for an ill child and elderly parents, for example. While the debtor him or herself is not incapacitated or disabled, those in their charge could be. So, the statutory language is delimiting in two ways: first, the categories for exception are limited and, second, within the categories, 1he eligible recipients are limited.
A further· requirement is that if an individual fits within the required categories, there is the added hurdle that a court must approve the exception. 79 The requirement specifies that such approval is based on notice and a hearing-which means that a hearing need not necessarily be held under Section 102(1).
80
However, someone--whether or not they are a lawyer-would still need to prepare an appropriate request, likely in the form of a motion. Clearly, anyone who fits within the exception would not be capable of appearing in court, at least not without huge expenses and delay. So, it would require, one must assume, some sort of"paper proof.""' How much proof must be obtained is unclear.
The perceived distrust of consumer debtors, their lawyers and the judiciary has led to a series ofexceptions that are so particularized that few genuinely challenged debtors fit within them. The counseling mandate is, then, required of virtually all debtors. While on its face the information offered by quality counseling would be beneficial (who can argue with more information being bad?), the narrowness ofthe exceptions sends a message that all debtors-regardless of how they ended up in debt--can benefit from counseling. Indeed, it is worth observing that there are whole categories of debtors for whom bankruptcy is the right alternative because ofcircumstances beyond their control; the degree of "financial responsibility" ofan uninsured person with cancer, burdened with medical debts, will not change with counseling. Stated differently, the mandate is so broad and the exceptions so narrow that we homogenize debtors and their problems. Whatever else it is, counseling should not be oversold as a solution to all that strikes debtors; at best, it will help some of the debtors some of the time. That message is not conveyed by the 2005 Amendments. That is legislation gone awry.
V. Is THERE A MESSAGE IN SiLENCE?
Given the number ofyears the bankruptcy amendments were debated, the Commission that was created, and the dozens of witnesses who prepared reports and publicly testified about the bankruptcy law's virtues and failings, one would think that the near 300 pages ofamendments would be, if nothing else, comprehensive. Clearly there was opportunity, over the course of eight years of discussion, to address and provide resolutions for every open, outstanding and unresolved issue that has arisen and could arise in the bankruptcy context. UnfOrtunately, there remain a number ofimportant issues that Congress failed to tackle in the course of drafting the bankruptcy 80. Id. 81 . See id.
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[VoL67:497 amendments, leaving unanswered many compelling issues. 82 The question raised by this failure to legislat~when there was clear opportunity-is whether there was an embedded message in this silence.
One issue Congress failed to address is the bankruptcy treatment offuture claims, claimants and obligations. 83 The concept offuture obligations and the use of bankruptcy to deal with mass torts, product liability claims and environmental obligations was not originally addressed by the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the definition of "claim" in Section 101(5) does not explicitly include these future obligations, nor does the Bankruptcy Code specify when a claim or obligation arises.•• Courts have danced around alternative approaches in an effort to reach a resolution of these issues." In the absence ofan explicit Code provision, some courts have expansively read "future claims" into the defmition ofclaim; 86 others have not been so willing to stretch the existing definition of "claim," holding that only those rights to payment which arise before the petition or during the Chapter 11 process can be considered claims under bankruptcy law. 87 Only for asbestos claims has there been a legislative amendment to the Code.
88 And yet, both the issue of when a claim arises and whether a future claim is even recognized are critical in a bankruptcy proceeding;•• experience over the past twenty-five years has 82. Examples include the absence of addre111ing timited tiability co""""ies' treatment in banlauptcy, failure to address mass tcrt trtatment in bankruptcy, issues surrounding banlauptcy ~ole entities, and broader channeling injunctions. 99 have all taken the position that LLCs ought to be treated as corporations under the Code. Yet, the rating agencies recognize the uncertainty in connection with certain transactions engaged in by LLCs and require legal opinions to conclude asmuch. 100 Notwithstanding the thousands of transactions involving LLCs that have gone forward in reliance on the position that, under bankruptcy law, LLCs are most aptly characterized as corporations, there remain strong arguments that LLCs are more like partnerships, and thus should be treated as such under the Bankruptcy Code.'"' The few courts addressing issues related to LLCs are divided in their approaches.
Col/iers,
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Because of the Bankruptcy Code's sileil.ce on this issue, organizers are faced with uncertainty as to how to minimize many bankruptcy and insolvency-related risks.
In light ofthe absence ofa definitive resolution ofhow LLCs ought to be treated in bankruptcy, the risks LLCs and their members are subject to are many: (i) the risk a transaction originator, as the sole LLC member, will compel the LLC to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition; (ii) the risk that the LLC will fail to survive the originator/sole member's bankruptcy or dissolution; ( 103. Since LLCs cannot be definitively cluuacterizcd as either panncrships cr corporations, the question ofwhether an LLC mcmhcr can file an invo~tary bankruptcy petitim agaiDSI thelLC mnains surrounding the effect ofa sole member's bankruptcy on an LLC. Moreover, LLCs risk a judicial characterization, and thus an outcome in bankruptcy that is inconsistent with the intent ofthe LLC and its transaction's counterparties.
The market has been functioning in reliance on the terms pursuant to which LLCs are organized as being enforceable in bankruptcy. If a bankruptcy court fails to enforce a particular term in an LLC statute or operating agreement because it has characterized the LLC as akin to another entity for bankruptcy purposes, the markets in which LLCs operate, including the near $2.5 trillion dollar structured finance market, may experience a seismic tremor.
And so the gaps in the laws with respect to future claims and LLCs are wide. At times it seems as ifthe law's silence with respect to these issues is deafening. But is there a message in this silence?
The simple answer is "yes"-there is a message in this silence. But, as with messaging and new legislation, the answer is multifaceted. As previously developed, we read into the 2005 bankruptcy amendments a message of distrust When we observe silence, however, one central explanation for the silence is the converse: trust. Trust in certain participants in the bankruptcy process, and trust in the markets in which bankruptcy plays out.
With respect to the law's treatment of LLCs and their role in the structured finance market, trust is evident in the confidence expressed in the finite pool of sophisticated players and the markets in which they operate. These players created the financial instrument, developed the market and oversee its operation. Few outside this complex market can understand it fully. When transactional risks surface, the players are agile: they can readily develop solutions or alternatives and, in so doing, they circumvent problems as, or even before, they occur. 104 In a sense, the way the structured fmance market operates makes it self-contained (for better or worse), and there is an open in the securitizatim context, as well as in other cmtcxts. In the case ofpartn""'bips, Sectim 303 provides that a general partner may trigger the filing ofan involuntauy case against the partnership. There is no COJql&l1lble provisim in the Code with~~to siwdloldcrs ofa corpotation wbo cannot trigger a filing unless they arc creditoiS. So, one needs to dctcmline whether !LCs abould be treated as a partn..,bip or a C01p0r81ion for purposes ofinvoking an involuntary filing under Sectim 303. Permitting geoeraJ partners to trigger an involuntary case apinst their pariDC1Sbip was intended to protect general partners who might be exposed to pcrsmal liability based 011 unwillingness among the market participants to let outsiders tinker-let alone change-that world. A legislative solution, then, would strip these participants of control and threaten the world they have created. As such, a hands-off approach has flourished and, by silence, legislators have acquiesced.
Whether the trust given to the players and their markets is deserved is actually not our question (although it is certainly one worth pursuing). Instead what we observe is the presence of trust and that very presence accounts for the accompanying legislative silence.
The context in which environmental hazards are addressed obviously differs from the structured finance context. It is not a closed universe of sophisticated players; future claims implicate businesses ofevery ilk. In more obvious ways than the banlauptcy-related issues implicated in structured fmance transactions, the treatment offuture claims facially implicates major social issues (such as health and well-being). With that said, the failure to legislate does suggest that there is trust in non-bankruptcy solutions to these issues-thus the absence of legislation. Perhaps there is a fear that a new banlauptcy-based legislative solution-before any major tort reform legislation takes hold-will negatively impact corporate research, development, insurability and market pricing. Indeed, a new bankruptcy solution could threaten corporate longevity. With such potential·risks, no solution (hence silence) may be a better solution. Whether this is an accurate perception of the impact of legislating with respect to future claims is again not our question (although thinking through tort reform is certainly worthy of discussion); our goal is to identify and explain silence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legislation needs to be read in light of political, social and cultural influences. In the context of the 2005 Amendments to the bankruptcy laws, we set about to explain the messages embedded in this new body oflaw. The overarching message broadcast by the new bankruptcy legislation is one of distrust. Distrust accounts for the Code's new particularization. What is disturbing is that the deep distrust ofthe system's key players was not overtly discussed, and the rhetoric surrounding the Code amendments was all about helping to improve the system and root out abuse. What this means is that what the Code says and what the Code means are two different things. Legislative silence sends a similar. message. Although perhaps less pernicious, we have identified trust and faith in organizations and players that may not be so deserving.
